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Arbitrator Behavior in Public Sector Wage Disputes
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes a new set of data on the decisions of conventional
arbitrators. The main goal is to draw inferences about the extent to which
conventional arbitration decisions are fashioned as mechanical compromises of
the parties' final offers, without reference to the exogenous facts involved in
different disputes. The results of the analysis are remarkably clear:
conventional arbitrators tend to split-the--difference between the parties' final
offers with virtually no evidence of additional systematic reference to the
facts of the cases. However, since there is a substantial amount of unexplained
variance in the arbitration decisions, this evidence of mechanical compromise
behavior should be viewed as characterizing the overall operation of
conventional arbitration mechanisms and not the behavior of individual
arbitrators in any particular case. Indeed, the results are consistent with the
view that individual arbitrators pay close attention to the facts of the cases,





New York, NY 10027I. Introduction
Arbitration is a rapidly-growing method for resolving disputes. It is used
widely in the U.S. and other countries to resolve private disputes arising under
commercial contracts and collective bargaining agreements, to resolve civil
disputes congesting court systems, and to set wages and other terms of new
contracts in repeat bargaining situations. Despite the wide range of settings
in which it is applied, and the numerous forms that it can take, the central
feature of virtually all arbitration mechanisms is that they involve a third
party, i.e., an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, hearing and deciding how a
dispute is to be resolved. Arbitration awards are generally binding, either by
law or by ex ante agreement of the disputants.
One of the most important characteristics of arbitration mechanisms is that
they may be designed in different ways. Indeed, one of the key dimensions along
which arbitration mechanisms differ involves the extent to which they constrain
an arbitrator's behavior. For example, under conventional arbitration, an
arbitrator is simply asked to render a decision that represents his or her best
judgment of a fair settlement. The settlement may, but does not have to be, a
compromise between the parties' final offers. In contrast, under final—offer
arbitration, each party is required to submit to the arbitrator a single
final-offer and the arbitrator -is constrained to render a decision that
consists of one or the other of those final offers, without compromise.
Final-offer arbitration is intended to induce concessionary behavior on the part
of risk-averse bargainers, each of whom perceives a tradeoff between the
probability of "winning" the arbitration and the size of the payoff they receive
if they win (Stevens, 1966).
Conventional arbitration mechanisms have been objected to on a variety of
grounds, the most serious of which is that they "chill" the negotiation process—2—
that precedes arbitration. This argument is rooted in the belief that
conventional arbitration awards systematically tend to be compromises between
the parties' final positions, thereby providing an incentive for the parties to
avoid pre-arbitration concessions. This assertion is difficult to evaluate. On
the one hand, it might be the case that arbitrators often make decisions by
reaching a mechanical compromise between the parties' final offers, without
paying much attent-ion to the merits of the case (although perhaps with a bit of
random noise). This might be an optimal strategy for arbitrators who want to
project an image of fairness so they are hired again by the parties. In
addition, since it is almost certainly easier and less time-consuming than
weighing the facts in a dispute, mechanical compromise (of which
splitting-the-difference is a special case) is also one way in which arbitrators
can engage in shirking. Finally, mechanical compromise might be an optimal
decision—making rule for arbitrators if the final offers themselves convey
useful information about the nature of efficient settlements. Indeed, if final
offers do contain useful information that arbitrators are particularly skilled
at extracting, mechanical compromise behavior is not a legitimate complaint
against conventional arbitration. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely in practice
that an arbitrator could determine whether a pair of final offers contained
useful information without at least some reference to exogenous data on the
facts of a case. In this situation, arbitration decisions will not be simple
mechanical compromises of the parties' final offers, but rather, they will be
functions of both the offers and the facts.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the parties' final bargaining
positions are determined by their expectations about an arbitration award. In
other words, if bargainers A and B expect an arbitrator to render a settlement—3—
that is relatively favorable to bargainer A, their negotiations will almost
certainly take place over settlements that tend to be favorable to A, provided
that arbitration is compulsory if they fail to resolve their dispute
voluntarily. Thus, arbitration decisions may appear to be mechanical
compromises of the parties' final positions, but only because the parties
aligned themselves around the arbitrator's preferred settlement point (see
Farber, 1981; and Ashenfelter, 1985).
The purpose of this study is to analyze arbitrator decision-making under
conventional arbitration. The main goal -is to try to draw inferences about the
extent to which conventional arbitration decisions are mechanical compromises of
the parties' final offers. This will be done mainly by estimating several
simple models of arbitrator behavior that have proven useful in recent empirical
studies. These models will be fit to a new set of data on arbitrators'
decisions in a series of hypothetical arbitration cases.
The following section will set out the empirical models of arbitrator
behavior that have formed the basis for empirical work in this area. Section
III will discuss the conclusions that can be drawn from previous attempts to
implement these models. Section IV will describe the experimental design used
to generate a new data set on the behavior of conventional arbitrators. Section
V will present and discuss the results of fitting alternative empirical models
to these new data. Section VI will discuss and summarize the main conclusions
of the paper.—4-
II. Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior
The purpose of this section -is to outline several general models of
arbitrator behavior under final-offer and conventional arbitration.1 The
fundamental premise of these models is that, under both systems of arbitration,
arbitrators form a notion of a preferred wage settlement -in one of two ways:
just from the facts of the case (X) or from both the facts of the case and the
employer and union final positions (we and wu). Thus, -in the first regime
the arbitrator's settlement (i.e., the percent wage increase, wa) -is given by
(la) wa=X+c
whereis a vector of weights and c is a random error that captures the effect
of unobserved variations in economic environments and differences in
arbitrators' assessments of those circumstances. Like previous studies, this
study will assume e to be normally distributed with zero mean and standard





Under final—offer arbitration, it is assumed that the arbitrator picks
the employer's offer when
(2a) a(wa_we)(w_wa)
if the first regime holds or when
(2b) a(we) <(wU)
if the second regime holds, where u >eand where a1 implies asymmetric
treatment of employer and union deviations from the preferred settlement.
Substituting for wa and a in (2a) and (2b) and rearranging terms leads—5—
to expressions (P1 and P2) for the probability that the employer's final offer





where oi ={a/(1+a) (1—7)721, —{l/(1+a)
-(1—7)/2J,and N(.) is the
cumulative distribution function for a standard normal variate.
For regime 1, observe (1) that [1-P1] is an expression for the probability
the union's final offer is selected, (2) that the probability expressions
(P1 and [1-P1]) are simple probit functions whose parameters can be easily
estimated by the method of maximum likelihood from appropriate data drawn from a
series of final-offer arbitration cases, and (3) that both a and a are
identified from the coefficients of we and w, implying that -isalso
identified. For regime 2, observe (1) that the probability expressions P2 and
[1-P2) are also probit functions although y and a are not separately
identified, (2) that the sum of the coefficients of e and is an estimate
of a, implying thatis identified, and (3) that even though a is not
identified, the hypothesis a =1can be tested from the difference between the
coefficients of e and wU (i.e., the difference is zero under H0 a =1).
Finally, observe that the reduced-form probit models suggested by regimes 1
and 2 are identical, even though the interpetation of the coefficients does
depend on the regime.
Under conventional arbitration, the theoretical model is conceptually
simpler because the arbitrator's preferred settlement is, by definition, either
or a depending on the regime that arbitrators use to make decisions.
However, the corresponding empirical models are not always equally
straightforward. In particular, if arbitrator decisions just depend on the-6-
facts of the cases, then equation (la) can be estimated directly by ordinary
least squares. On the other hand, if arbitrator decisions depend on both the
facts and the final offers, -it would seem natural to estimate equation (ib)
directly, also using ordinary least squares. However, that regression ignores
the potential simultaneity of the average final offer and the arbitrator's
expected decision. In addition, it is not usually possible to fit that
regression since e and wU are generally not explicit -in actual conventional
arbitration decisions. Thus, the term (l_Y)E(We + Wu)/2] will become part of
the error structure under regime 2. Unfortunately, since e and are
probably correlated with X, their omission from an ordinary least squares
regression will bias the estimates of fifregime 2 holds.
Two other properties of these alternative models of arbitrator behavior are
also worth noting. First, if the decisions of conventional arbitrators are
generated by model (la), it would be unnecessary for the parties' to formulate
and express final positions. Insofar as final offers are an important
institutional feature of the arbitration process, model (la) may be too simple a
representation of arbitrator behavior.Second, if arbitrator decisions are
rendered according to model (ib), optimal final offers will always be both
divergent and extreme and all bargaining cases will end up in arbitration.
However, as a practical matter, the fraction of bargaining cases that end up in
arbitration tends to be less than one—third. In addition, although final offers
under conventional arbitration are sometimes extreme, they are typically not
more than a few percentage points apart (see Bloom and Cavanagh, 1987, esp.
Table 1).Thus, equation (ib) may also be too simple a representation of
arbitrator behavior. We will examine this possibility empirically by estimating
a more complex model in which the weight that arbitrators place on the final-7-.
offers (i.e., 1 -y),depends on the distance between them. These estimates
will help us to determine whether arbitrators treat final offers that are
further apart as less informative.
III. Previous Literature
A. Review
The main implications of the models discussed and presented in the previous
sections are (1) that simple regressions of conventional arbitration decisions
on the facts of the cases and the parties' final offers may lead to incorrect
inferences about the true weight that arbitrators place on the parties' final
offers (i.e., because of simultaneity bias associated with the effect that
expected arbitration decisions may have on the final offers); and (2)
regressions that include the facts of the case but omit the parties' final
offers (because they are unavailable) may lead to biased estimates of the
weights the arbitrators attach to the facts. These problems seriously hinder
our ability to test important hypotheses about the nature of arbitrator behavior
using data derived from actual conventional arbitration systems.
To date, two alternative approaches have been adopted to circumvent the
inherent problems involved in analyzing the behavior of conventional
arbitrators. The first approach, due to Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984), takes
advantage of a novel feature of the arbitration system operating in New Jersey.
Under that system, unresolved pay disputes between (unions of) municipal police
officers and their public employers must be settled by arbitration. However,
the form of arbitration is only conventional if both parties agree to it. In
the absence of such an agreement, the dispute is settled by final-offer
arbitration. Thus, the New Jersey system is a unique laboratory in which to—10—
mechanical compromise behavior. The presence of some perversecorrelation
between the mode of arbitration chosen bythe parties (i.e., final offer or
conventional) and the random component of arbitratorbehavior would have a
similar effect.
Overall, the Ashenfelter-Bloom model does not provide aparticularly strong
test of the mechanical compromise hypothesis. Nordoes it provide unambiguous
results with regard to this issue. For example, the hypothesisis not rejected
in the simple specifications reported, but it is rejectedin the richer
specifications. However, the great strength ofthis model -is that it tests the
mechanical compromise hypothesis using data derived from an operating
arbitration system.
Like the Ashenfelter-Bloom study, the Bazerman—Farber approachto testing
for mechanical compromise behavior under conventional arbitrationalso has
several problems. First, the twenty—five hypothetical arbitrationscenarios
sent to actual arbitrators were constructed so that thefinal offers were
orthogonal to the "facts" of the cases. This featureof the scenarios has no
analog in actual arbitration where final offers areendowed with information
content via their link to the facts of a case. This is unfortunatesince it
is the information content of the final offers that makes it potentially
sensible for the arbitrators to give them weight (see Gibbons 1987for an
interesting model of this communication process). Thefailure to provide
arbitrators with any decision-making criteria is also unfortunate.
Second, according to Bazerman and Farber, the conventionalarbitration
decision was equal to one or the other of the parties' final offersin 386 out
of their 1522 cases (25.4 percent). This result stands -in strongcontrast to
actual arbitration systems -in which arbitration awards infrequentlylie on the—11—
bounds of the parties' final positions. This boundary problem undoubtedly
resulted from arbitrator confusion as to what to do in cases in which the facts
suggested a settlement that lay far away from the offers (which happened
because of the "pathological" relationship between the facts and the final
offers). Although Bazerman and Farber ignore this information in their
empirical analysis (as explained below), it represents strong evidence that
arbitrators are influenced by the parties' final offers.
Third, Bazerman and Farber report 196 cases (12.9 percent) in which
arbitrators' decisions were either greater than the union's final offer or less
than the employer's final offer. These cases might be interpreted as evidence
that arbitrators are not influenced by the parties' final offers. However,
almost all of these cases reflect scenarios in which the "facts" and "final
offers" are grossly inconsistent (e.g., the final offers probably looked like
typos to the arbitrators). Insofar as arbitration awards rarely lie outside the
bounds of the parties' final positions in real-world arbitration, their
inordinate prevalence in the Bazerman-Farber data raises serious questions about
the external validity of their experiment.
Fourth, Bazerman and Farber try to handle their "extreme" data points by
estimating a model that treats as censored all observations that lie on or
outside the bounds of the final offers. In other words, all of the
Bazerman-Farber results about mechanical compromise behavior are based only on a
non-random subset of their cases in which arbitrators were either not strongly
influenced by the parties' final offers or did not have good reason to ignore
the offers entirely.
Overall, the fact that the arbitrator decisions were identical to one or
the other of the parties' final offers in roughly one-fourth of the cases is—12—
prima fade evidence that arbitrators do pay considerable attention to the
parties' final offers, even when they contain literally no information. This
finding could be explained in (one or more of) the following three ways. First,
arbitrators may not be particularly skilled at identifying cases in which final
offers have no information content. Second, arbitrators may engage in
mechanical compromise behavior in order to appear fair, but they failed to
realize that they had no such incentives in the Bazerman-Farber simulations.
Third, the self-selected arbitrators who participated in Bazerman and Farber's
study were simply lazy and failed to reveal information about their likely
behavior in actual arbitration cases. Nonetheless, because the final offers
are exogenously fixed, one conclusion of the Bazerman—Farber study is clear:
the evidence of mechanical compromise behavior is not generated by bargainers
positioning themselves around the expected arbitration award.
IV. Experimental Design
Although Bazerman and Faber's study has flaws in both its design and its
analysis, the basic idea of conducting an "experiment" to learn about arbitrator
behavior is quite clever and fundamentally sound. Thus, it seems reasonable to
repeat the experiment that they conducted in a way that overcomes as many of the
problems they faced as possible. This task was begun in early 1984 by sending
a new set of hypothetical arbitration cases to roughly the same population of
arbitrators (i.e., members of the National Academy of Arbitrators).
Four cases were prepared for this experiment. These cases were all based
on the records of actual bargaining disputes that were arbitrated under the
New Jersey Arbitration Law during the years 1980 to 1983. Police officer
wages were either the sole or overriding issue in dispute in all of these—13—
cases. All of the arbitrators in the sample were provided with the following
information:(1) general background information on the public employer and
the public employee union; (2) information on the bargaining history that led
to the arbitration; (3) the final positions of each party and a description of
the arguments advanced in support of those positions (or against the other
side's position); and (4) statistical exhibits supporting the positions of one
or both parties. Arbitrators were asked to examine the information describing
the bargaining dispute, to consider that information in light of New Jersey's
Arbitration Law, and to render a conventional arbitration award ordering the
implementation of whatever salary (or salary increase) they thought to be
most reasonable. Arbitrators were also provided with a two-page description
of the New Jersey Arbitration Law that included a list of the substantive
items they were supposed to weigh in their deliberations (e.g., comparability,
ability—to-pay, cost—of-living, financial health of the municipality, etc.).
Data on police officer salaries in 6 New Jersey communities and 4 non-New
Jersey communities from 1979 to 1983 were provided as background information
for the arbitrators. Finally, arbitrators were provided with a decision form
asking them to record their decision and to outline the basis for it. This
form also requested information about the professional background and
experience of each arbitrator and asked for an evaluation of the arbitration
exercise.
In the process of preparing the four abridged arbitration cases, a curious
feature of the link between facts and final offers was discovered. In
particular, -it was observed in the actual arbitration cases that the arguments
used to advance a particular position were never so narrowly specified so as to
imply a unique final position. In other words, it seemed clear that the—14--
arguments could be used to support a range of final positions in the vicinity of
the final position actually advanced. This feature of adversaryism in interest
arbitration was exploited in the experimental design by sending different
arbitrators cases that were identical in all respects except for the final
positions of the parties (see Table I). Since knowing which of the four cases
an arbitrator was being asked to decide completely summarizes the facts of the
case, any variations in the conventional arbitration decisions that are
positively correlated with variations in the final offers may be interpreted as
evidence of mechanical compromise behavior.
Unlike the Bazerman—Farber study in which all members of the National
Academy of Arbitrators were asked to arbitrate 25 hypothetical cases each, the
present design asked each arbitrator to consider just two cases (one
conventional arbitration case and one final—offer arbitration case, although the
final offer cases are not analyzed here). In addition, arbitration cases were
only sent to arbitrators who were not members of New Jersey's panel of interest
arbitrators (some of whom might have had considerably more information about
the New Jersey municipalities, such as the actual final offers). Of the 527
arbitration exercises mailed out, responses were received to 186. Of these,
131 responses did not include arbitration decisions, either because they
indicated (1) that the arbitrator was deceased, (2) that the arbitrator did
not have the time to participate in the study, (3) that the arbitrator would
not participate in the study without pay, (4) that the arbitrator did not feel
competent to resolve wage disputes because of lack of experience with them, or
(5) that for a variety of reasons, the arbitrator did not think the study
could reveal useful information about arbitrator behavior. Overall, the 55
arbitrators who did respond tended to be statistically similar to those who15—
participated in the Bazerman and Farber study: they are generally above the
average of all National Academy members in terms of both overall arbitration
experience and interest arbitration experience (i.e., the respondents have an
average of 22 years of arbitration experience and roughly 6 percent of their
cases involve disputes of interest). Since interest arbitration presently
accounts for only 5 percent of all arbitration cases (only 2 percent before the
early 1970's), it is not surprising that many arbitrators chose not to respond
to the exercise for lack of expertise.
It is difficult to gauge the potential biases that are introduced into
the study by the self-selection of arbitrators. However, the importance of the
results presented herein does not depend critically on the sample of included
arbitrators being representative of the population of all labor arbitrators. In
other words, the mere fact that a segment of the nation's top practicing
arbitrators are participants in this study would seem to dictate that the
results be taken seriously. Also difficult to evaluate, but probably worth
reporting, are the arbitrator's evaluations of the exercises. In answer to
the question: "To what extent do you feel that these exercises capture the
key features of actual arbitration cases?" the distribution of arbitrator
responses was as follows: "Not at all," 6 percent; "To Some Extent," 16
percent; "Reasonably Well," 59 percent; "Very Well," 14 percent; and "Almost
Entirely," 5 percent. In addition, the average evaluation score and the
response rate varied little across the four city scenarios.—16-
V. Estimation Results
The purpose of this section is to determine whether the arbitrator
responses to the arbitration cases described above permit us to make
inferences about whether regime 1 or regime 2 is more likely to be the true
model generating conventional arbitration decisions.
Table I reports the average percent wage increase awarded by arbitrators
for each of the 12 sets of semi—distinct cases circulated (i.e., for each of
the 3 pairs of final offers associated with the bargaining disputes in the 4
cities under consideration). The striking feature of this table is that the
average arbitration award increases when the average of the employer and union
final offers increases, in each of the four cities. Although few of the
differences are statistically significant, mainly because of small cell sizes,
this pattern of results does suggest the main result that the regression
estimates below will confirm: that the decisions of arbitrators are
influenced by the parties' final offers.
Table II reports least squares estimates of the parameters of the two
models of conventional arbitrator behavior set out in Section II. The first
model corresponds to equation (la) and represents a regression of conventional
arbitration decisions on the facts of the case (i.e., on a vector of city dummy
variables). The second models correspond to equation (lb) and represent
regressions of conventional arbitration decisions on both the facts and the
final offers in each case. The first of the estimated forms of equation (lb) is
simply a reduced-form regression in which the facts and final offers are entered
as right-hand side variables. The next two columns report estimates of the
structural parameters of equation (ib) (i.e., f, a and y); these estimates are
computed from regressions in which the weights associated with the facts and the
final offers are not scaled by the estimate(s) of y.-17--
Table II indicates that the average arbitration award in the 55 cases being
analyzed was 6.72 percent with a standard deviation of 1.82 percent. When the
arbitration awards are regressed on a vector of city dummy variables, the
standard deviation of the residuals drops to 1.52 percent. In addition, the
coefficient estimates for the city dummy variables -indicate significant
differences among arbitration decisions in the different cities (F[5,51) =8.88,
compared to a critical value of 2.41 for a test constructed at the 5 percent
level). Since there were literally no differences in the facts presented for
individual cities, these dummy variables may be viewed as completely
characterizing those facts. Thus, under the maintained hypothesis that
conventional arbitrators' render decisions without reference to the parties'
final offers, the estimates of equation (la) suggest that arbitrators are able
to discern differences between the cases that they reflect in their
decisions.
It is, of course, possible that the significance attributed to the facts
results from omission of the final offers from the regression. In other
words, since the offers are correlated with the underlying facts of the case
by design, misspecifying the regression by omitting the offers might result in
the coefficients of the city dummies picking up their own effect plus some of
the effect of the offers. The first column of estimates of equation (lb),
which simply adds in the average of the parties' final offers as a regressor,
is informative about this possibility.Indeed, there are three noteworthy
features of these estimates. First, the city dummies are no longer significant
in this equation, either singly or jointly. In addition, the coefficients of
the city dummies all become quite small in magnitude when the average final
offer enters the equation. Second, the average final offer explains-18-
significantly more of the total variation in the arbitration decisions than do
the facts of the cases.2 Third, the coefficient on the mean of the final offers
(i.e., .880) is significantly greater than zero, but not significantly different
from one. Thus, a clear winner seems to emerge when the facts and the final
offers are permitted to "fight it out" in the regression. Nevertheless, it is
worth noting that there is still a considerable amount of random variation in
the decisions of the arbitrators even after the inclusion of both the facts and
the final offers (e.g., the standard error of the regression is 1.4 percent).
The first column of structural coefficients reports parameter estimates
that are not scaled by y. Note that the point estimates of the structural
constant and the city coefficients are reasonably large in magnitude, although
none are significantly different from zero. Thus, the data seem to contain
little information about the arbitrators' underlying preferences viz-a-viz the
facts of the cases. Alternatively, the data may be indicating that there is
considerable variation in the structure of different arbitrators' preference
functions. In addition, since none of the intercepts are significantly
different from zero and since the estimate of 1-y (the weight on the final
offers) -is not significantly different from one, it appears that the
relationship between the arbitration decisions and the average of the final
offers is well-described by a 45 degree line that goes through the origin. In
other words, it appears that arbitrators tend to engage in mechanical compromise
behavior that can literally be described as "splitting-the-difference."
The final column of estimates -in Table II differs from the preceding column
in that it does not constrain the weights attached to employer final offers and
union final offers to be equal. As with the previous model, none of the
coefficients of the facts are significantly different from zero. In addition,-19-
it is most remarkable that the estimated weights associated with the union and
employer final offers are extremely close in magnitude and estimated with almost
identical precision. Thus, the simpler model in which arbitrators weigh the
final offers symmetrically appears to provide a very satisfactory fit to the
data.
Because of the built-in correlation between the facts and final offers in
this experiment, these results do not demonstrate that arbitrator decisions are
completely independent of case facts. However, they do indicate that
arbitrators pay little systematic attention to the case facts beyond the
information they extract from the final offers. If one views the final offers
in this experiment as representing some function of the facts plus random noise,
the results in Table II indicate that the arbitration decisions do vary
positively with the noise. This result can be further verified by fitting
separate regressions of the arbitration decisions on the average of the final
offers for each city. Although there are relatively few observations per city,
these models provide the fullest possible set of controls for the case facts and
provide a very strong test of whether arbitrators respond to the "noise
component" of the parties' final offers.
Table III reports the results of these city-specific regressions. It is
worth noting that the regression lines for Camden, Mahwah, and North Bergen are
all well—approximated by a 45-degree line that passes through the origin. In
contrast, the estimated line for Mount Olive is flatter, although the slope is
significantly greater than zero. Overall, this pattern of results indicates
that arbitrator decisions tend to split the difference between the parties
final offers, albeit with a good deal of unexplained variation (as indicated by
the relatively low values of R-squared).—20-
Finally, following Bazerman and Farber, one additional model was estimated
in which the weights associated with the facts (i.e., y) was itself modeled as a
linear function of the difference between the union and employer final offers.
This is a reasonable model to estimate to test whether arbitrators look more
closely at the facts of a case when the final offers are far apart. However,
unlike the results reported by Bazerman and Farber, the estimates of this model
provide no evidence that y varies with the difference between the parties' final
offers.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
The growing reliance on conventional arbitration mechanisms for resolving
pay disputes arising in labor-management relations has been accompanied by
numerous debates over the nature and operation of such mechanisms. A basic
point in contention is whether or not conventional arbitrators make decisions by
mechanically compromising between the disputants' final offers. If this -is
indeed the way arbitrators tend to make decisions, then conventional arbitration
may provide disincentives for bargainers to engage in concessionary behavior -in
the negotiation process that precedes arbitration. As a result, conventional
arbitration will tend to increase the fraction of disputes that are settled by a
third-party. This contradicts a fundamental tenet of the American system of
industrial relations --theprinciple of voluntarism —-accordingto which it is
desirable for bargaining outcomes to be determined by the individual parties to
the greatest extent possible. It seems especially worthwhile to research the
extent of mechanical compromise behavior in view of (1) the popular perception
of labor relations practitioners that conventional arbitrators often do
"split—the-difference;" and (2) the growing use of final-offer arbitration,—21—
which creates a whole new set of theoretical and practical difficulties just to
prevent arbitrators from compromising between the parties' final positions.
Unlike previous studies that apply sophisticated econometric techniques to
relatively weak data (and report finding little evidence of compromise
behavior), this study seeks to generate somewhat richer data and to apply a
simple econometric technique. Ultimately, it is impossible to determine the
extent to which conclusions drawn from these data generalize to behavior in an
actual arbitration system. Nonetheless, the fact is that all of the
arbitrators who provided decisions for this study are members of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, an organization of the most experienced arbitrators in
North America. In addition, 78 percent of the participating arbitrators
indicated that the arbitration exercises captured the main features of
interest arbitration "reasonably well" or better. Finally, since all of the
arbitration awards analyzed were accompanied by a one paragraph arbitration
decision in which arbitrators almost always justified their decision in terms
of the facts of the case, it is hard to argue that arbitrators decided these
cases in a substantially different manner than they would decide an actual
case (i.e., that because they were not being paid to arbitrate the
experimental cases and presumably had no incentive to be asked to arbitrate
such cases again, they took the easy way out by splitting—the-difference).
Indeed, the variability of arbitrator decisions in the experimental data
analyzed in this study is similar in magnitude to estimates of
cross-arbitrator variability derived from actual arbitration decisions in New
Jersey (see Ashenfelter and Bloom, 1984, esp. Table 3). Nonetheless, the fact
that the arbitrators had no financial incentives to respond carefully to the
cases they decided must surely be viewed as a potentially important limitation
of this study.—22-
Taken at face value, the results of this study are remarkably clear:
conventional arbitrators tend to split—the--difference between the parties' final
offers with little additional systematic reference to the facts of the cases.
However, because of the substantial amount of unexplained variance in
arbitration awards, this characterization of arbitrator behavior should not be
regarded as applying to any particular case. Rather, it reflects a systematic
tendency of arbitrators across some population of cases. Indeed, of the 55
decisions analyzed in this study, only 8 were exactly equal. to the average of
the parties' final offers.
The results of this study do not necessarily imply that arbitrators ignore
the facts in the cases they hear. Indeed, the nature of the written arbitration
decisions analyzed in this study supports the view that arbitrators do pay
attention to the facts. Thus, the statistical results seem to be indicating
that arbitrators do not share a common preference function. In other words,
arbitrators do give weight to the facts, but different arbitrators do it so
differently that the weight tends to show up as random noise. This conclusion
is supported by estimates of significant inter-arbitrator differences in
behavior presented in Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) and Bazerman (1985), and in
research on Iowa's system of tn-offer arbitration discussed in Ashenfelter
(1985 and 1987).
The results of this study provide evidence that arbitration deci'ions are
not invariant to the individual who is hired to be the arbitrator. In the
context of public adjudication or under a grievance arbitration mechanism, this
conclusion might be disturbing since the notion of justice seems to require
such an invariance property --atleast at a particular point in time. Wage
arbitration is, however, fundamentally different from the adjudication of—23—
these other types of disputes since their is no absolute standard for a "fair"
wage. Moreover, the randomness introduced into the system by inter-arbitrator
differences may have additional benefits insofar as uncertainty about the
individual who will arbitrate a dispute will provide risk—averse bargainers
with an incentive to settle their dispute both voluntarily and expeditiously
(see Bloom and Cavanagh, 1986).
The estimates presented in this study suggest that the standard deviation
of the underlying distribution of arbitral preferences, controlling for the
facts of a case, is 11.75 percent. Put another way, if arbitrators were asked
to decide the cases in this study without having any knowledge of the parties'
final offers, roughly two—thirds of the awards would be in the range -8.5
percent to 15.0 percent, and one—third of the awards would lie outside that
range. Perhaps arbitration systems provide arbitrators with knowledge of the
parties' final positions to lower this grossly high variance. Alternatively, it
might be that arbitrators would be able to lower the variance themselves by
studying the facts of the cases more closely in situations in which final offers
were not available. One might even conjecture that final-offer arbitration is
just the type of mechanism that can induce arbitrators to extract relatively
more information from the exogenous facts of a case.
The results of this study are consistent with the view that conventional
arbitrators use the parties' final offers to provide information as to the range
of settlements that bargainers are likely to view as acceptable. Since this
task could probably be accomplished more inexpensively by averaging the parties
final offers and adding on some noise using a computer's random number
generator, the findings of this study raise important questions about
arbitration's raison d'etre. Undoubtedly, the answer to this question has—24-
something to do with the superior ability of a human arbitrator to fine tune
arbitration decisions, to endow them with legitimacy in the eyes of disputants,
and to induce bargainers to reveal true reflections of their underlying
preferences. But this is surely an incomplete answer to a question that seems
most worthy of deeper consideration.—25--
Footnotes
1. Although the focus of this paper is on conventional arbitration, models of
arbitrator behavior under final-offer arbitration are also reviewed in this
section since they can play an important role in identifying the parameters of
conventional arbitrator behavior.
2. The R2 from a regression that just includes the average of the final offers
is .447.—26-
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Pairs of Employer and Union Final Offers
and Average Arbitration Awards, by City
City
Camden Mount Olive Mahwah North Bergen































= employer'sfinal offer in percent
=union'sfinal offer in percent
N =numberof observations with each pair of final offers
(total number of observations equals 55)Table II
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Equation (la) and


















































a 1.822 1.519 1.404 11.74 11.92
R2 .343 .450
*Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient
estimates. The standard errors of the structural estimates of the constant and
the coefficients of the city dummies -in equations (ib) were computed from the
asymptotic distribution of the ratio of two coefficients (e.g., the regression
constant (y) and the estimate of -y implied by the regression coefficient on
**North Bergen isthereference category for the city dummies.Table III
City-Specific Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Equation (lb)*
CITY
PARAMETER! MOUNT NORTH
RHS VARIABLE CAMDEN OLIVE MAHWAH BERGEN
CONSTANT 0.800 4.526 -3.482 -0.155
(5.121) (1.077) (5.028) (3.603)
(We+Wu)!2 0.791 0.373 1.380 0.976
(0.811) (0.137) (.613) (0.626)
R—squared .11 .36 .27 .17
Number of 10 15 16 14
observations
*Estimatedstandard errors are reported in parentheses below
coefficient estimates.